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Abstract
This paper argues that ‘choice’, along with similar concepts,
has a very important role in design and technology
education. The paper seeks to demonstrate the importance
of the concept of choice at a variety of levels in design and
technology curriculum. It sets out some discourse to
highlight and clarify areas of misunderstanding while also
articulating the educational power of the concept of choice
when delivered in the context of design and technology.
Some of its uses are neither well thought through nor
immediately apparent. Examination of any forward-
looking design and technology documentation unearths
terms such as choice, decision making, options, competing
variables and so on but the rationale for these is not always
consistent.
At a more philosophical level, matters of will, volition and
determinism emerge. The manifestation of these variants of
‘choice’ are identified in curriculum contexts and common
themes are drawn out. One common phenomenon is that of
presenting ‘choice as action’ – the student exercises choices –
but these are limited to the requirements of the design task.
Further, the social, political and philosophical dimensions
of choice are presented for the ways they are determinants of
design and technology curriculum development and for how
they might shape pedagogy. There is also explanation of
how design and technology fits with general education
because of the ways it can teach about choice and the
exercise of choice.
Keywords
choice, design and technology, curriculum, pedagogy, ethics,
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Introduction
This paper begins with an overview of the common
senses in which we understand the notion of choice.
It then explores understandings that have developed
around consumer choice and points to relationships
between technologies and political choice. These
introductory explorations are then set against their
associated philosophical backgrounds. Together, these
discussions inform the presentation of the educational
significance of choice in relation to design and
technology – firstly, with a discussion of design
practice; secondly with an overview of curriculum
issues, and finally, with an articulation of pedagogy.
The common senses of choice (as noun, but also in
verbal and adjectival forms) are several and, rather
like technology, are so embedded in daily use that we
rarely stop to critique them. So far as technology is
concerned, Palmer speculates: 
‘Do we inhabit a world already formed by
technological choices so complex that many seem
almost invisible (e.g. the pencil, the telephone, the
washing machine)? Do many technologies appear
before us as autonomous and beyond choice
(computers at work, videos at home, cars to go
between them)?’ 
(Palmer, 1994: 77) 
This notion of technology as pervasive yet invisible is
also cogently pursued by Sclove (1995). Both authors
argue that choice – or importantly, the lack of it – is a
focal matter for the social, cultural and political
manifestation of technology. Similarly, choice is a focal
matter for design and technology education.
What on first examination seems an everyday sort of a
word turns out to have rich meaning. We might talk
of a choice as one of a set – for example, of foods, of
ideas, or of actions – thus, respectively, a plum
pudding, a birthday gift, or a means of travel. To have
a choice implies ‘more than one’ and from the
selection we may organise a hierarchy – first choice,
second choice, etc. To have a wide or generous choice
may mean we are ‘spoiled for choice’ or can enjoy a
choice as a luxury.
Conversely, one may have ‘no choice’ – such as
avoiding the oncoming elephant – or, so far as
selections are concerned, Hobson’s choice (Hobson
kept a stable of horses in Cambridge, England. They
were hard-worked on his stagecoach run to and from
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London yet he would rent out the horses to students
who would be obliged to take whichever horse was
nearest the stable door. Hence ‘Hobson’s choice’ – or
‘no choice at all’). A different sense of ‘no choice’ was
offered by Henry Ford for his Model T cars – ‘any
colour so long as it’s black’. 
We can talk of choice in the sense of picking, for
example from a pack of cards, while we might select
from a box of chocolates. So long as we can’t see the
cards and we can see a range of chocolates, the kind of
choice differs. In both cases, if some of the cards or
chocolates have already been taken then we have a
limited choice. If asked why we chose a particular
card we might argue that really we didn’t have much
of a choice – they all looked the same. However, with
the chocolates the possibilities for rationalisation
increase considerably. We might have picked our
favourite. We may have picked the most tasty of those
left. We might have chosen the hazelnut for it’s
nutritional value over the sugar-centred one. We
might have avoided the coconut as we knew it to be
the favourite of the next person to choose. We may
have chosen not to choose because there was one less
chocolate than the number of people being offered
them, and so on.
When we choose, the constraints on our choosing
vary. Choosing what to wear one morning is governed
by our wardrobe and, invariably, what the context will
be – the level of formality, factors of comfort and
perhaps ‘dress codes’. Choosing who to vote for is a
resolution (or compromise) of a different kind. Here,
choice is the exercise of preference. Having one’s
political values reflected in a single candidate or party
may well not happen. The choice is then one of
‘choosing not’ to vote for other candidates. So a
voting choice may well be described as ‘the ‘best of
those available’ or ‘the least worst’. So far as choosing
an idea is concerned, it may seem that our choices are
limitless but then the capacity for imagination or the
availability of useful and applicable knowledge may
limit the choices.
So the notion of the ‘informed choice’ arises and it is
from such a notion that the complexities associated
with choice begin to emerge. One may often make a
choice but, had we held, before the event, some other
piece of information, we may well have made a
different choice. It is often the case that we want to
know more about the attributes of each of a range of
choices before we finally choose. For example,
knowing the durability and maintenance potential of
one product over another may well influence our
choice of purchase. Conversely, some would rather not
have the full information whether because of a
perception of confusion and an urge for simplicity of
choice or because the ethical dimensions of choices
become more explicit the more one knows about the
options. For example, knowledge of the source or
method of manufacture of a product – perhaps with
dubious labour use and working conditions – may
seem better not known so that we need not feel any
guilt about buying the product.
Thomson (1999), in her discussion of decision-
making, points out that being clear about what
choices or options are available is one thing, but that
there is also a need to work out the implications or
consequences of such choices. One may need more
information to support decision-making and,
ultimately, one is evaluating options to assess the most
preferable. Thomson thus identifies four important
components of decision-making – options (choices),
information, consequences and evaluation. (Thomson,
1999: 92) Clearly choices do not happen in isolation
of values. To have a choice would seem to imply the
freedom to be able to choose and is thus an important
aspect of the dynamics of democratic life. With this
kind of choice comes responsibility – the
consequential nature of one’s choices as they affect
others.
On a final note for this overview, we might also
consider making ‘the right choice’ just to please
others or to gain approval from parents, teacher, peers,
or colleagues. One may make the ‘right choice’ in the
sense of ethically defensible decision-making. This is
not to say that ethics can be arbitrated on binaries
such as right and wrong. We seek to present a
rationale for choosing to act and live in particular
ways. (Design decision-making is much the same.)
Consumer choice – oxymoron, fact or fallacy?
To talk of chocolates is to talk of a luxury even in a
(materially rich) minority world society. To majority
world societies, ‘a box of chocolates’ could be
anything from strange to offensive. Thus our choice
of a particular chocolate from the box happens as a
result of a choice-as-action (of buying a particular box
of chocolates) which in turn resulted from the
decision or intention to buy chocolates (the choice
being available to us) – all of which happened in a
context that allowed such choices to occur, namely, a
society of a certain economic and material regime.
The kinds of choices we (perceive we) have rapidly
become distorted when framed against both the micro
and the macro. In the macro-picture of the world we
are spoiled for choice. We have technologies the
absence of which would start near-revolt. We take a
supply of water for granted and any threat to personal
car transport is never welcome. In the minority world
these ‘givens’ are assumed and are, therefore not
matters for any troublesome choice-making.
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However, one can choose not to have a car and live
consequentially by that decision. The alternatives are
generally very limited. Yet, ironically, one can live
with the car and enjoy the (also limited) choices the
market allows – colour (rarely black), accessories,
grunt, style and cost. Difference and individuality are
enjoyed within a commonality. Thus what is
presented as choice is rarely a real choice guided by a
set of ethical principles as with Amish culture (Sclove,
1995) but, rather is a pseudo-choice presented within
a tightly constructed market framework.
In the consumer society we may perceive a ‘range of
choices’. However, it can be shown that the lifestyles
to which we aspire and the needs (or wants) we
perceive are rarely more than carefully designed and
marketed lifestyles and products. For example, ‘Sony
protest that market research has limited value …
because the consumer is not aware of what new
products s/he may desire.’ (Whiteley, 1993: 21). So
Sony design the products and then convince us we
need them. The same culture ensures the gendering of
products in ways that choice is steered and, implicitly,
limited so that only the most strong-willed
(expressors of alternative choices) would resist or
challenge. This case is well attested in such texts as
Illich (1983); Wacjman (1991); Whiteley (1993);
Green and Guinery (1994); and MacKenzie and
Wacjman (1999).
Politics, technology and choice
Historically, technology has evolved along with the
species. It was used and developed without much
questioning and enjoyed a special status – still
advocated in populist ways – under the banner of
‘progress’. Mumford (1934) refers to the ‘Doctrine of
Progress’:
‘The mechanism that produced the conceit and the
self-complacence of the paleotechnic period
(loosely, the 18th and 19th Centuries) was in fact
beautifully simple. In the 18th Century the notion
of Progress had been elevated into a cardinal
doctrine of the educated classes…
Life was judged by the extent to which it
ministered to progress, progress was not judged by
the extent to which it ministered to life. The last
possibility would have been fatal to admit … What
paleotect dared ask himself (sic) whether labor-
saving, money-grubbing, power-acquiring, space-
annihilating, thing-producing devices were in fact
producing an equivalent expansion and
enrichment of life? That question would have been
the ultimate heresy. The men who asked it, the
Ruskins, the Nietzsches, the Melvilles, were in fact
treated as heretics and cast out of this society…’ 
(Mumford, 1934: 182-185)
However, it might be argued that recent times have
provided us with something extra. It is important that
we recognise the amassed bodies of knowledge and
sophistication available to us in the 21st Century. We
are now equipped to realise consequences, to
understand the intertwined nature of technology,
culture, society and politics. We are able to
discriminate and choose. Or are we?
Today, it can also be argued that, in the absence of a
critical and questioning climate, society is unable to
make adequate choices about technologies and
continues to shadow them under the guise of
‘progress’. Postman (2000) demonstrates the strong
links between the technological and political climate
of the closing 18th Century and that of today, arguing
that a critical technology education is both necessary
and urgent.
Rybczynski (1983); Palmer (1994); Sclove (1995);
Winner (1995) and Feenberg (1999) all write lucidly
of technology-politics relationships. They show how
our choice-making (in free, limited or non-existent
forms) about technologies mirror the kind of society
we have in both enabling and (more would argue)
disabling ways. Sclove (1995) discusses technology as
both enabler and disabler of democracy and
democratic process and points to the potency, or
impotence, of the individual in society. As these
political-democratic issues are explored it is matters
of the individual and collective choice that emerge –
choice of lifestyle, choice of environment, of
education, welfare, governance and so on. Sclove’s key
claim is this:
‘…it is possible to evolve societies in which people
live in greater freedom, exert greater influence on
their circumstances, and experience greater
dignity, self-esteem, purpose, and well-being. The
route to such a society must include struggles
toward democratic institutions for evolving a more
democratic technological order. Is it realistic to
envision a democratics of technology? Isn’t it
unrealistic not to?’
(Sclove, 1995: 244)
To ‘struggle toward’ implies the exercise of choice in
the active sense and this is predicated on the choice of
vision. The engagement of democratics presupposes
ethical engagements with justice, welfare and futures.
To such ends, discussion and envisioning of
democracy is essentially an ethical question, of which,
more below.
Rybczynski (1983) discusses three ways of controlling
technology, all of which imply choices and decision-
making. He considers the evolution of the design of
machines – from the tool stage, to powered devices
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and then to automated processes – that
‘…progressively, and specifically, increases human
control.’ (Rybczynski, 1983: 166). (Although Fry
[1992] also illustrates the way such evolution has a
disempowering and dehumanising side for the
individual.) Rybczynski continues, citing White:
‘But there is a second way in which the machine is
under control: the choice is made whether or not
to use it. Technology is not automatically used
simply because it is there. Lynn White Jr has
cautioned: ‘As our understanding of the history of
technology increases it becomes clear that a new
device merely opens a door; it does not compel
one to enter. The acceptance or rejection of an
invention, or the extent to which its implications
are realized if it is accepted, depends quite as
much upon the condition of a society, and upon
the imagination of its leaders, as upon the nature
of the technological item itself.’ If there is a
technological plot we are far from being its passive
victims and are more like co-conspirators.’ 
(Rybczynski, 1983: 166)
His third, and for its time and today, much more
ambitious consideration of technological control
promotes the notion that we recognise that there are
different (small ‘c’) civilisations on earth and that it
may well be that one civilisation exercises its choice
to reject the technological condition (sometimes
called, pejoratively, ‘sophistication’) of another. If one
section of the world attempts to force its ways –
through a version of technological imperialism –
on another then it must certainly be anticipating a
constraint of choice for the latter.
Mumford (1934) recognised the significant
cumulative effects of choices, arguing that:
Technics and civilization as a whole are the result
of human choices and aptitudes and strivings,
deliberate as well as unconscious, often irrational
when apparently they are most objective and
scientific: but even when they are uncontrollable
they are not external. Choice manifests itself in
society in small increments and moment-to-
moment decisions as well as in loud dramatic
struggles; and he who does not see choice in the
development of the machine merely betrays his
incapacity to observe cumulative effects until they
are bunched together so closely that they seem
completely external and impersonal.
(Mumford, 1934: 6)
Meanwhile Barr (1994) offers a note on the social and
political consequences for technological choice relating
to information technology and Australian society. 
In the context of debate about technological
change and the future, the political system as a
whole has the effect of inhibiting curiosity and
limiting public awareness. In terms of the
knowledge and confidence to contribute to
discussions about technological futures, the
Australian people are very information poor
indeed. In this climate the public learns passivity,
helplessness and cynicism in the face of
technological choice.                     (Barr, 1994: 102)
Philosophy and choice
Although an everyday term, ‘choice’ has good reason
to appear as an issue – something about which people
might be concerned – in society and politics. ‘Choice’
has enjoyed a place in more than one field of
philosophical discourse and an overview of these is
helpful.
Weatherford discerns similarities and differences
between choosing and deciding. These are not of great
concern here although he does contend that a choice
may occur without deliberation whereas a decision
calls for it. He comments that ‘Also, it is at least more
natural to speak of deciding and not choosing what is
true’ (Weatherford, 1995: 133). However, when
considering technologies and designs we are often
faced with multiple possibilities and thus multiple
truths. Final decisions may well be rational choices.
Clearly, choice plays its part in discussions of
freedom, free will and determinism. Are we truly free
to choose – either within our cultural, social and
political contexts or given the level of information we
may hold? Have we a free will to exercise? The
determinists would say not. The broad thesis is that
all events in the world are the effects of earlier events.
A more focussed view concerning humanity
questions:
‘…whether we ourselves, persons, are subject to
the same sort of causal necessity….Indeed,
determinism has been taken as the more limited
thesis that all our choices, decisions, intentions,
other mental events, and our actions are no more
than effects of other equally necessitated events.’      
(Weatherford, 1995: 194)
Initially it would seem that the determinist question
matters to design and technology education. There is,
amongst a variety of genres of determinism (e.g.
scientific, historical, psychological, sociological), a
view that technological determinism holds sway.
Here, technology in its holistic or universal sense is
deemed to be determined by earlier technological
events and so drive social, cultural and political
developments. Any interactive model of the interplay
of, say, a cultural influence on the development of a
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technology is denied. Technology drives us and is
beyond our control. In a logical sense we can see
when an innovation is a re-development of an existing
technology but there is an equally significant sense in
which the decision or choice was made to carry out (or
not carry out) the re-development.
Such choice-making is, arguably, an exercise of free will,
yet many of us would deny that we played any part in
the decision-making and development concerning the
technologies in our lives. Whilst we might deny
technological determinism we are not best positioned,
at present, to say that we willed our technologies into
existence. Here the sense of our individual and
collective disempowerment seems to emerge.
It is hardly surprising that populist views on
technology hold sway. ‘That’s the way things are
going’; ‘You can’t stop progress’; ‘It’s all inevitable’.
To yield to such views is to deny a capability to act,
which, of course, is both to deny the existence of
choices and to deny the point of choosing to act.
Sometimes this is the easy way out, since making
choices and exercising will in a democratic society
also require responsibility. 
Stances against technological determinism, are several
and strong. Oliver (1994) refutes ‘fatalistic
determinism’ (there are soft determinists and hard
determinists) and advocates:
‘human intervention (her emphasis) rather than
reliance on the divine, free flow of market forces in
an open economy … It will demand that
communities and governments go through the
difficult, yet immensely exciting, process of
choosing a preferred destination and charting a
path to achieve it.’
(Oliver, 1994: 49)
Other philosophers and sociologists of technology are
adamant that the determinist argument be nailed and
humanity’s capacity-to-choose and act be recognised
and validated (Rybczynski, 1983; Wacjman, 1991;
Green and Guinery, 1994; Mitcham, 1994; Sclove,
1995; Feenberg, 1999; MacKenzie and Wacjman,
1999; Postman, 2000).
Mitcham (1994) critiques a range of soft and hard
determinist authors and then builds an existentialist
case of three ways of ‘being-with technology’ (after
Heidegger). He suggests that: 
‘Humanity and technology can be found together
in more than one-way. Rather than argue the
primacy of one or the other factor or the cliché of
mutuality in the humanity-technology
relationship, we can better pursue understanding
through a structural examination of three forms
the relationship itself can take…
’ (Mitcham, 1994: 275)
Warnock (1996) points to the common interest held
by existentialist philosophers in human freedom.
‘They are all of them interested in the world
considered as the environment of man (sic) …
because of his power to choose his own courses of
action’ (Warnock, 1996:1). Her postscript, some 25
years on, places existentialism ‘…with other decision-
making moral theories’ (Warnock, 1996: 141). This
moral philosopher argues that ethics implies choice
and is thus apparently incompatible with determinism
or, conversely, that ‘choice’ is illusory for
determinists. She argues the centrality of ethics to
life, she shows that moral value cannot ‘be’ without a
human, and she asserts the necessity both to value,
and pass on, from one generation to the next ‘the idea
of ethics’ through moral education.  (Warnock, 1998: 109).
Singer’s (1995) practical text on ethics is concerned with
the question of how we should live. He grounds his
work on what he terms ‘The Ultimate Choice’ between
two fundamentally different ways of living – between
ethics and self-interest. His case is both challenging and
articulate. He points to two kinds of choices:
‘Ultimate choices take courage. In making
restricted choices our fundamental values form a
foundation on which we can stand when we
choose. To make an ultimate choice we must put in
question the foundations of our lives.’
(Singer, 1995: 5)
This is as far as the philosophical discussion of choice
need go for this paper. Suffice to note that if one is to
engage with notions of determinism, freedom, free
will, ethics or democracy then the concept of ‘choice’
is a key one. 
Design and choice
Winner (1995) articulates the capacity of design to
give space for matters of ethics and choice when
considering technologies.
‘To seek genuine choice in technology – a matter
about which there often seems to be no option but
to respond to firm economic imperatives –
involves an effort to explore alternative prospects
for the making of useful devices and to understand
what importance those options would have in
practice. If we are to appreciate qualitative
differences between the works found in a
technological society and the forms of civic life
they sustain, such differences must first be seized
within the space of design possibilities.’ 
(Winner, 1995: 151)
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He points out that in this design space alternatives
can be considered ‘…before choices have hardened in
cement…’ (Winner, 1995: 151) and this highlights the
valuable fluidity of design practice. We know that
design is about resolving competing variables. We
know that we can revise and refine existing designs.
We also know that we can choose to create anew. We
know that multiple solutions are often possible and
just as we can set about creating a choice so we can
subsequently offer choice to others (the client, the
community etc.).
Roberts (1994) highlights ‘intention’ when asking, as
Singer does – how do I/you/we want to live? He talks
of design as the ill-defined problem, working with
uncomfortable choices and also of the significance of
informed choice. Out of these aspects of design
practice he rightly identifies the potential for the
student to ‘…(make) meaning, knowledge and
cultural identity.’                         (Roberts, 1994: 178)
When one is designing it is almost impossible to
avoid choices. Invariably, by searching for them, more
issues or problems arise. To make the effort (to
choose) to create choices and pursue, with both
comfort and discomfort, increasing possibilities can
lead to an ultimate satisfaction but it can also
engender frustration. However, we also know that
with the right teaching, frustration can be managed
and the professional designer and student alike learn
that there are ways to achieve outcomes and satisfy
our choices (see e.g. Kimbell and Perry, 2001). Cross
(1995) also gives a useful analysis of design ability and
draws on Gregory’s notion of design as ‘…the action
of intentional intelligence.’ (Cross, 1995: 106). The
significance of intention occurs again and this cannot
happen without, at least, choice-as-will and, if
followed through, choice-as-action.
It must be remembered that the ethics of design
matter if one is to have responsible design intentions,
choices and outcomes. The notion of responsible
design is now well broadcast (e.g. Papanek, 1974;
Whiteley, 1993; Ellyard, 1998) but far from adopted in
the world of economic rationalism. As moral
philosophers show with ethics so do design theorists
with design – both activities are about choice making.
Both are classed by the less informed as being ‘out of
touch with the real world’. Nothing could be further
from the truth so far as ethics and design are
concerned. Both are about values and about humanity.
As for our ‘ultimate choice’ posed by Singer (1995), if
the way forward is not to be self-interest then it will
be ethics and design that shape a preferred future.
Curriculum and choice
Before discussing pedagogy and in particular, design
and technology pedagogy, it is necessary to comment
on curriculum – which is taken here to be ‘…all those
discursive practices which affect what and how
students learn, and what and how teachers teach.’
(Reid and Johnson, 1999). This holistic approach is
necessary if one is to appreciate curriculum as a
matter of ideology and contestation (Apple, 1979 and
2001). As Apple (2001) says:
‘The idea of the ‘consumer’ is crucial … For
neoliberals, the world in essence is a vast
supermarket. ‘Consumer choice’ is the guarantor
of democracy. In effect, education is seen as one
more product like bread, cars, and television …
Thus, democracy is turned into consumption
practices…the ideal of the citizen is that of
purchaser. The ideological effects of this position
are momentous. Rather than democracy being a
political concept, it is transformed into a wholly
economic one.’
(Apple, 2001: 39)
However, the ideology is nothing without effective
practice. The shaping of curriculum as purveyor of
ideology was well documented by Simon (1985; 1988)
in England and Wales. More recently, Smith (1999:
172) comments ‘The official ‘mood’ of school
education in contemporary western society is
dominated by a ‘specify, measure and report’
approach.’ The flow-on is programmes of
unenlightened vocationalism, basic skills tests and
uncritical adoration of information technologies.
Skills (prescribed ones) are valued. Independent or
student-centred approaches to education are not. The
teacher is positioned as technician delivering the
curriculum – or so it is wished.
Good practice, good ideas and good teaching do not
disappear on the arrival of ideological imperatives and
there are democratic ways that the curriculum can be
constructed and enacted. Boomer (1999) articulates
democratic classroom attributes of explicitness,
negotiation, questioning and reflection. In such a
climate notions of ‘diverse personal individuality’
(Harrison, 2001: 62), working from and promoting ‘the
learner’s strength’ (Kimbell and Perry, 2001: 13) and
cross-curricular ‘essential learnings’ such as identity,
futures and thinking (DETE, 2001) are all facilitated –
and through all of these choice is expressed.
For design and technology, at its best and properly
supported, there can be no doubt of its efficacy and
place in a democratic curriculum. The fact of the
matter is essentially simple. When students are
actually empowered to express their individuality,
develop their identity, work from their strengths, they
can do so with ease through design activity. If such
design activity is enabled by system and teacher alike,
then choice will be mobilised, and democratic, values-
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rich practice will be the norm not the curiosity. How
then does choice manifest itself in design and
technology pedagogy?
Pedagogy and choice
Whilst the actual practice of design is rich with choice
activity in several different ways, there are some
obvious limitations on true choice occurring.
However, these are not as problematic as at first may
seem. The student may not be able to make the most
informed choice at a particular stage of their
development. The same lack of knowledge could be
said for most adults when it comes to resolving
technological choices. Invariably, the skill of the
teacher is about leading a group (legitimately, from
behind at times) in ways that both model democratic
practice and facilitate quality learning. 
The oft-heard argument that children are not ready
for democratic practice and must be benevolently
dictated to has its parallel in design and technology –
the teacher who says that the students are not ready to
design until they have ‘the skills’. Such an approach
illustrates other aspects of design and technology
‘choice’ (or lack of, or avoidance of, it) admirably. The
skilling, in technical ways, does nothing for critical
thinking, independence, intentional intelligence,
identity or community. Under the guise of a pathway
to employment and with accompanying assessment
systems the skilling displaces design – which is
perpetually put off ‘until the senior years when the
students are able’ – by which time it is too late to
unlearn, not the content but, the style of learning.
Choice of learning is denied by the developed
dependence on ‘transmission’ of what the teacher has
chosen, or been told, to deliver. Colloquially known as
spoon-feeding, this model supports the teacher who
‘chooses’ to opt out of the seemingly hard task of
designing for their students design experiences which
centre and valorise the students’, and not the teacher’s
or the system’s, interests.
This is not to argue for an ‘anything goes’ approach
which amounts to any or all of inefficiency, chaos or
danger. There are ways of establishing an enabling
environment and, to take one of Boomer’s democratic
classroom attributes, negotiation, he has a litmus test
to ask whether the teacher has:
• a commitment to children becoming more 
and more self-reliant and socially critical
• a genuine belief in the child as constructor of
his/her knowledge
• a genuine and demonstrated capacity to be
persuaded away from certain designs after due
argument
• therefore, a degree of vulnerability. (Boomer,
1999: 105)
These, as we know from best practice, are a few of the
attributes of the good design and technology teacher,
whose classroom and pedagogy are values-rich, are
open to critique and refinement, and show a healthy
human respect for the student. 
Choice-making while designing is managed or facilitated
by the teacher. It is neither dictated nor unlimited.
The regular mixing and blending or a spectrum of
open and closed design briefs may or may not facilitate
choice at their particular moments but they will
educate about choice if openly admitted and exposed and
offered for discussion. Choice does not begin and end
as ‘design with the corners knocked off ’ (we’ll all make
a book/CD/penguin rack and you can ‘design’ the
shape of the corners – or death by a decade of
webpages). Educationally legitimate choice will be a
matter of negotiation, of exploring the unknown and
the uncertain, and engaging with values issues. 
Design education cannot be transmitted. It transpires
and transforms and, throughout, a double edge of
choice-making is at play. On the one hand, choices are
available and created by designerly thinking but, on
the other, as the journey progresses, choices can cease
to be and new ones emerge. This is knowledge
creation on-the-go and it is personal and without end.
Between the choices there are times of critical
reflection, new realisations of further possibilities.
Seeing what is possible and finding ways to realise
these possibilities are learned through design
education and are applicable in ethical and political
life beyond schooling. In all of design, ethics and
politics, matters of choice are exercised.
Conclusion
Choice is not the simple concept that we might take it to
be. As individuals, communities, societies, civilisations
and as a species, we have choices and there are many
ways we may exercise them and there are many ways in
which they are inhibited or denied. We have a human
capacity to choose – it is something of our essence.
Further, we can choose to choose and we can create
choices. We can even choose not to choose. These are
manifestations of our free will and our determination.
A most fundamental educational achievement would
be to teach children and students that they have
choices – from the seemingly insignificant to the
highly significant – and that there are many ways they
can exercise choice.
Design and technology has a particular educational
role to play. Choice-making (choosing) and choice-
creating are both key aspects of designing. Design is
intentional and pro-active. It involves defending
decisions and imagining alternatives. By exercising
and understanding choice in its richest sense,
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students enhance their designing capability and
efficacy.
Of at least equal importance, there are the ‘whole person’
and general education benefits to be gained from choice
education through design and technology. For the
former, students develop their intentional intelligence
and their identity. For the latter, their choice education
works synergistically with ethical education, civics and
citizenship education and their political education. Too
often the textbook and hypotheticals approaches remain
removed from the student – too often these approaches
are teacher-centred.
Children of all ages and cultures live and engage with
their built environments and can use their sense of
fairness and justice to explain when things aren’t
‘right’. They can learn through quality design and
technology education that technologies don’t have to
be taken up and that all designs and technologies can
be held liable to criticism and, if need be, alternative
choices can be created. Students can learn that will
can be expressed and that ethical action is a matter of
choice. Their design decisions and all they entail
provide an ideal grounding for learning that the
future can be determined by their choice.
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Abstract
The paper commences by way of some general comments on
the potential of technology in education. It recalls the
characteristics of the early technologies, i.e. paper and
printing press and post-war technologies, i.e. telephone,
radio, photographic film, slides and audio recordings,
overhead projector, film, video and mixed media and
transmission through satellite networks. It examines the ever
growing interest and ‘needs felt’ to employ the ‘new
technology’, for education in general and for technology
education in particular. It briefly explains the transient
concepts of mass education, individualised learning and
group learning, which occurred in quick succession.
Research findings on the effectiveness of different
educational technologies are briefly stated in terms of the
real benefits of technology in technology education.
The next part of the paper is devoted to examining the
phenomena of learning, retention, recall and critical
thinking from the point of view of behaviourist and
cognitive psychologies and to look at the concepts of higher-
order learning. An attempt is made to show how human
learning curves improve with the infusion of educational
technology and variety in learning. It is proposed to adopt a
graphical observation form, which includes the effective use
of educational technology for classroom activity analysis.
Salient features of technology education in the context of
design and technology are highlighted. An attempt is made
to discuss the technology-propelled paradigm-shift and to
identify the extent of software and hardware of technology
required to create better learning through teaching-learning
processes based upon new technology. Critical issues for
evaluating the effectiveness of new technology are
identified. Facts and figures on technology integration in the
teaching-learning process are quoted from different parts of
the world.
Finally, the paper dwells on the last decade of the turn of
the millennium and the scenario with the onset of video
conferencing, Internet conferencing, e-learning, etc. with
regard to their outreach and relative effectiveness. Possible
impact of the one-computer classroom is taken up to show
how the availability of minimum infrastructure can be used
in the developing world. Criteria for selection of appropriate
technology is spelt out in some detail. A case is made for
greater investment in staff development in the integration of
new technology. The paper concludes by enumerating the
ways in which the impact of new technology is made visible
and by envisioning the not-so-distant future.
Keywords
education, technology, design, development,
communications, learning, teaching
Introduction
You might have noticed that the word ‘technology’
occurs twice in the title of this paper – both as the
cause and the effect. The first one refers to
educational technology and the second is technology
education. It follows that the word technology is
going to be used repeatedly with techno-terms but I
shall try not to ignore the words ‘teaching’ and
‘learning’; I propose to use them to limit my
discussion to these areas of application. 
A topic like ‘Impact of New Technology on Teaching
and Learning in Technology Education’ occurs
naturally to policy makers, who would like to see the
positive correlation between improvement in
education and technology costs, as in Curve A, Figure
1, before committing further investments. They
would also like to see if smaller incremental costs in
technology could bring about greater improvement in
education as shown in Curve B. Let me clarify at the
outset that educational improvements depend upon a
multitude of factors including school setting,
curriculum, staff development, management, students
interest and of course, state of technology.  Even the
effectiveness of technology is a function of several
variables that we shall discuss and there is no way an
educationist can produce such graphs!
Figure 1: Expectations of policy makers.
The best we can do is to step back and ask ourselves
some practical questions:
• can a new and emerging technology be
reasonably evaluated in relation to improving
teaching and learning processes? If so, how? 
• can we create technology-based infrastructures
for technology education? If so, how?
• can a new technology meet the new challenges of
knowledge explosion and diverse learning
Impact of new technology on teaching and learning
in technology education
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